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NR. 15 APRIL 2018 Introduction 
Labour Clauses for Sustainability? 
Colombian Trade Agreements Exemplify Potential and Limits 
Evita Schmieg 
Modern free trade agreements increasingly seek to address environmental and 
social concerns. While the EU pursues a dialogue-led “soft approach”, the United 
States relies on threats of trade sanctions. Colombia offers an interesting example 
in this connection. It has agreements with the United States, Canada and the EU, 
which the respective parliaments declined to ratify until they included provisions 
to improve the situation of labour and the trade unions. Controversy over the fun-
damental relationship between trade policy, sustainability and human rights has 
coloured the discussion in recent years. Experience already gathered with labour 
clauses permits conclusions to be drawn for the shape of future trade policy instru-
ments, including those of the EU. The findings presented below confirm the impor-
tance of sustainability provisions in trade agreements and the significance of 
strengthening local institutions. 
 
During recent years Europe has witnessed 
a burgeoning discussion about the question 
of including environmental and labour 
standards in free trade agreements (FTAs) 
in order to strengthen sustainability. In an 
options paper in July 2017 the European 
Commission named a range of goals that 
could be pursued by this route: (1) imple-
mentation of international conventions, 
(2) fair international competition (“level 
playing field”) and (3) sustainable use of 
resources. The question now is whether the 
EU should improve and continue its dia-
logue approach, or rather seek to include 
sanction options in trade agreements. 
Colombia represents an interesting 
example, because the issue of labour is 
treated differently in important trade 
agreements with the United States, the 
European Union and Canada. The United 
States and the EU are major and economi-
cally significant trading partners, with 
shares of 29.5 percent and 13.2 percent 
respectively; Canada is much more mar-
ginal, with 1.5 percent. The present con-
tribution explores experience gathered with 
these different labour clauses, and includes 
observations from fieldwork and interviews 
conducted by the author in Colombia. 
Labour Clauses in Colombia’s 
Trade Agreements 
The Colombian-Canadian Free Trade Agree-
ment of 2008 was supplemented in August 
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2011 by a bilateral Agreement on Labour 
Cooperation. An Action Plan on labour 
standards was included in Colombia’s 2011 
Trade Promotion Agreement with the 
United States after the US Congress refused 
to ratify the latter until the Colombian 
government committed to addressing the 
problem of assassinations of trade union 
activists and the lack of prosecutions. 
The agreement of 2012 with the European 
Union contains – like all recent EU FTAs – 
a comprehensive sustainability title, which 
also covers labour issues. The European 
Parliament and some of the member states’ 
parliaments felt its provisions were too 
weak, above all in view of the difficulties 
faced by trade unions in Colombia and the 
lack of a sanctioning mechanism. In June 
2012 the European Parliament adopted a 
resolution on the EU–Colombia/Peru agree-
ment calling for the EU’s Andean partners 
to establish “a transparent and binding road 
map on human, environmental and labour 
rights”. 
Different Anchors 
What the EU and Canada demand is 
essentially that Colombia implement the 
core labour standards of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO). Both countries’ 
agreements with Colombia also provide for 
a broader exchange of information and a 
dialogue on labour issues. The Canadian 
agreement places considerably more con-
crete demands on the involved institutions. 
The Action Plan attached to the US agree-
ment is broadly based on the ILO Declara-
tion on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work. According to US-based researcher 
Kimberly Ann Elliott, US negotiators re-
jected a Colombian suggestion to take as 
the point of reference the ILO core labour 
standards – not all of which the United 
States has ratified. The US side, she says, 
feared that such a move would generate 
more resistance than support in Congress. 
Nevertheless, with thirty-seven concrete 
measures the Action Plan Colombia nego-
tiated with Washington goes into a great 
deal more detail than its agreements with 
Canada and the EU. Certain key elements 
were even formulated as preconditions for 
the agreement to come into effect. One of 
these was the reinstatement of the labour 
ministry, which occurred in 2011. 
The internal discussion within Colombia 
initiated by the US Action Plan led in May 
2011 to a Tripartite Agreement on Freedom 
of Association and Democracy. This up-
dated an agreement concluded in 2006 
between the Colombian government, the 
trade union federation CGT and the em-
ployers’ association ANDI. The updated 
agreement explicitly sets out to fulfil the 
commitments made in the US Action Plan, 
the sustainability title in the FTA with 
the EU, and the rules of the International 
Labour Organisation. The internal debate 
appears to have greatly reinforced domestic 
political commitment to the respective 
demands, as does the fact that the issues 
were discussed at the highest political level. 
To this day, the Action Plan is referred to 
as the “Obama-Santos Plan” after the presi-
dents serving when it was adopted. 
In its 2012 resolution the European 
Parliament calls for Colombia to prepare 
a road map, suggesting that this take into 
account the US Action Plan. The demands 
included freedom of association, ending the 
obstruction of trade union activity (includ-
ing a ban on “collective pacts”) and an end 
to impunity for killings of trade unionists. 
As such, the resolution is much more spe-
cific than the sustainability title in the EU 
agreement. It accords great significance to 
civil society in implementation, and calls 
for an institutionalised complaints mecha-
nism. But mid-2012 was too late to initiate 
a discussion process, and the Colombian 
side did not take up the concrete demands 
(including civil society participation). 
Large parts of the road map Colombia is 
implementing in the process of joining the 
OECD replicate the US Action Plan and the 
Canadian and European Union/Parliament 
demands. The Colombian government 
treats OECD accession as a top priority, 
complementing the 2016 peace agreement 
that ended the country’s civil war. OECD 
membership is regarded an instrument of 
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national modernisation, in part on the basis 
of an expectation of greater foreign direct 
investment. 
Verification 
All the agreements provide for verification. 
The US system is the most sophisticated, 
with intergovernmental consultations 
several times a year as well as regional 
discussions and controls. The US Adminis-
tration publishes annual progress reports 
on its website, while Congress tracks 
progress through frequent Congressional 
hearings. The US trade unions participate 
actively in the National Advisory Com-
mittee for Labor Provisions of U.S. Free 
Trade Agreements. In the case of Colombia 
they have already lodged a complaint. 
The parties to the EU agreement meet 
regularly in committees established by the 
agreement to discuss all relevant questions; 
labour issues are discussed in the sustain-
able development subcommittee. The 
Colombian government reports legal re-
forms to the subcommittee, and progress 
has already been achieved. However, the 
EU Commission does not conduct checks of 
its own on the ground. So the intensity of 
discussion of labour issues and the political 
pressure to press ahead with reforms is a 
great deal weaker than in the scope of the 
US process. 
Sanctions Mechanisms 
The different agreements offer very differ-
ent options for imposing sanctions in the 
event of violations of agreed labour clauses. 
In the US agreement the dispute settlement 
mechanism provided for the trade side of 
the agreement also applies to labour issues, 
so trade sanctions can be imposed in re-
sponse to violations of labour standards. 
The agreement with Canada permits finan-
cial sanctions of up to $15 million per year 
where a party fails to meet its obligations. 
This can be triggered where a party fails 
to properly enforce its own labour laws or 
contravenes any of five internationally 
recognised rights and principles – as long 
as the violation concerned has an effect on 
trade. The fines flow into a fund for financ-
ing labour-related projects in the country 
where the clauses have been violated. 
The agreement with the EU provides 
for a group of experts to resolve disputes. 
It may also include external experts, for 
example from the ILO. The group of experts 
prepares a report containing recommen-
dations, and the country’s government pre-
pares an action plan to fulfil those recom-
mendations. But the sustainability title is 
explicitly excluded from the agreement’s 
general dispute settlement system, so trade 
and financial sanctions are not possible in 
that area. In this respect the EU has re-
mained true to its traditional dialogue-led 
approach. 
Progress on Labour Rights 
Assessing whether agreed reforms have 
actually taken effect presents the trade 
partners and the OECD with considerable 
problems. These are discussed in the fol-
lowing in relation to a number of central 
issues. 
Labour Administration 
and Labour Law 
Colombia is required to beef up its labour 
administration, combat “informality” in 
employment (undeclared labour, informal 
firms and labour contracts) and properly 
enforce its labour laws. According to the 
country’s labour ministry, the number of 
labour inspectors has doubled since 2010 
and their salaries have been increased. As 
a result, it says, the total volume of fines 
imposed for violations of labour law has 
doubled since 2014. The OECD’s Trade 
Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) notes 
that despite an increase in the number 
of inspectors, the number of inspections 
actually carried out has fallen, especially 
in rural areas. Only 62 percent of inspectors 
actually carry out inspections, it reports, 
and where fines are imposed they are mostly 
not collected: businesses appeal against the 
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penalty, delay the legal process, and wait 
for the statute of limitations to run out 
after five years. Colombian trade unions 
argue that this demonstrates the inefficiency 
of the labour administration and the lack 
of political will to bring about change. 
Strengthening labour inspections repre-
sents an enormous challenge for the Colom-
bian government. The state lost control of 
parts of the country during the long armed 
conflict, which it did not regain the instant 
the 2016 peace agreement was signed. As 
well as the lack of administrative infrastruc-
ture for fulfilling state tasks adequately, 
even the physical infrastructure is often 
missing. To address that difficulty, the 
United States backed its Action Plan from 
the outset with a development project 
overseen by the ILO. This will establish an 
IT system to create a framework for inspec-
tions and document their findings. This 
should reduce the time required to com-
plete an inspection to seven months, from 
two to three years today. 
The existing procedure with inspections 
managed at the local level produces neither 
comparability nor transparency. This also 
means that the figures cited for earlier in-
spections are unverifiable – and might 
explain the apparent discrepancy of more 
inspectors conducting fewer inspections. 
The IT system has so far been introduced in 
Colombia’s departments and major cities, 
but not in lower tiers – especially those 
without internet access. An additional chal-
lenge is that fines are issued by the labour 
ministry, but collected by the National 
Vocational Training Agency (Servicio Nacio-
nal de Aprendizaje, SENA) – whose IT sys-
tem is not connected to the new one in the 
labour inspection system. It is planned to 
remedy this by autumn 2018. That will im-
prove transparency and potentially increase 
the pressure to actually collect the fines. 
The trade unions and the government 
differ greatly in their assessment of the 
facts. The government points out that im-
portant processes have been set in motion. 
For the trade unions the yardstick of suc-
cess is real improvement in the situation of 
the workers; changes confined to legal and 
institutional spheres do not count. One 
reason for this is that in Columbia it is not 
at all unusual for contracts to be signed and 
laws promulgated – but never actually 
implemented. 
Collective Bargaining and 
Freedom of Association 
Colombia is expected to bring about change 
in the areas of both collective bargaining 
and freedom of association. The trade 
unions acknowledge that an agreement 
concluded in 2017 between the government 
and the public sector trade unions brought 
about improvements for more than one 
million workers. But, they say, the situation 
remains problematic in the private sector, 
where the practice of internal company 
pacts (“pactos colectivos”) continues. The 
term “collective” is misleading in this con-
text because the ILO connotation of col-
lective negotiations with trade unions does 
not apply in the Colombian context. In-
stead, “pactos colectivos” undermine trade 
unions by merely simulating a pretence of 
collectivity. As one interview partner put it: 
“it is neither a pact nor is it collective” (Ni 
es un pacto, ni es colectivo). In reality, they 
said, each employee went on their own to 
the head of HR to sign the “collective pact”. 
Even if the Colombian government were 
to exhibit strong political will to put an end 
to this practice it remains a great challenge 
to distinguish when a trade union is 
operating truly freely within a company, 
and when it only appears so. According to 
the National Trade Union College (Escuela 
Nacional Sindical, ENS) more than two 
thousand new trade union organisations 
have been created since 2013. In order to 
assess their real role it is necessary to check 
the respective agreements and the circum-
stances under which they came into being. 
The ENS concluded that many “pactos 
colectivos” had simply been renamed as 
trade unions and failed to satisfy the ILO 
criteria. This demonstrates the limits to 
controls instigated by FTA partners, such 
as representatives of the US Department 
of Labor. A proper assessment of progress 
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means getting deep into the weeds of 
internal data and processes. 
Violence against Trade Unionists 
One important demand is to end the per-
sistent violence against Colombian trade 
unionists along with the culture of im-
punity for such crimes. Although the 
number of killings of trade unionists has 
roughly halved since 2010 (to fewer than 
twenty annually) and the government 
points to a national protection programme 
(with 475 members in 2016), TUAC reports 
that the number of cases of threats against 
individuals linked to trade unions has in 
fact increased – from 118 incidents in 
2015 to 181 in 2015. 
Impunity also remains an issue. Although 
the government reports an increase in the 
number of convictions, the United States, 
Canada and TUAC point to the persistently 
high number of cases that actually go un-
punished. The problem is further exacer-
bated by the culture of violence that exists 
in the country after five decades of armed 
conflict. Individuals prominently involved 
in indigenous affairs, environmental cam-
paigning or social activism have also been 
targeted with violence and assassination 
threats. 
Public Dialogue 
Other successes of the trade agreements are 
easier to identify. For example they contrib-
ute to transforming the culture of stake-
holder dialogue and the role of civil society. 
The agreement with the EU and – espe-
cially – the European Parliament’s reso-
lution both call for civil society in the 
partner countries to be closely involved in 
implementing the FTA. To this end the 
Colombian government intended to consult 
the already existing Standing Committee 
on the Coordination of Wages and Employ-
ment Policy (Comisión Permanente de Con-
certación de Políticas Salariales y Laborales, 
CPCPSL). This tripartite body – analogous 
to the structure of the ILO – includes the 
government, which uses it almost exclu-
sively to inform civil society. But the debates 
over the trade agreements also led to the 
creation of an additional internal consul-
tation group (grupo consultivo interno) 
independent of the government. Here the 
dialogue between European and Colombian 
trade unions played a particularly impor-
tant role. A meeting of civil society repre-
sentatives from the EU, Colombia, Peru and 
Ecuador in Lima in November 2017 adopted 
a resolution underlining the interests of 
civil society and demanding effective en-
forcement of laws, greater participation by 
civil society and a complaints mechanism 
for the latter. 
Recommendations on the 
Issue of Labour in FTAs 
A central place for labour standards: 
Labour clauses in FTAs can certainly play a 
role in improving the situation of workers. 
In 2016 such provisions were found in 76 
FTAs, out of more than 260 notified to the 
World Trade Organisation. A study pre-
pared by the ILO investigated the effects 
of such clauses. Fairly unsurprisingly, no 
labour market impact was registered at 
the highly aggregated level, apart from an 
increase in the labour force participation 
rate. But case studies show that the com-
bination of technical cooperation, verifica-
tion mechanisms and civil society partici-
pation has contributed to improving the 
labour rights situation in various sectors. 
That is also the experience in Colombia, as 
confirmed by local fieldwork. About half 
the measures required by the US Action 
Plan have now been implemented. They 
mostly concern the level of structures and 
laws, but the first practical successes are 
also being seen. 
Greater leverage through conditionality 
and (financial) sanctions: The United 
States has had good experience with con-
ditionality in the sense of tying trade agree-
ments to particular conditions. This is an 
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instrument that large, economically power-
ful trade partners can use to ensure that 
objectives that have already been agreed 
internationally are actually achieved. The 
EU should in future demand that countries 
that are in a position to do so ratify the ILO 
core labour standards. 
Sanction mechanisms are supposed to 
heighten the incentives to adhere to agreed 
rules. But it is unclear whether that actually 
occurs. Since the turn of the century the 
United States has included the possibility of 
trade sanctions in many FTAs, also covering 
labour standards. Washington has taken 
only one case to the final stages of arbitra-
tion, however, and it is anything but en-
couraging. The case, against Guatemala, 
dragged on for nine years and was ultimately 
rejected. The panel concluded that Guate-
mala was failing to adequately enforce its 
labour laws, but ruled that the case was not 
relevant to trade and sanctions were there-
fore not permissible. 
Trade sanctions are a double-edged 
sword anyway. Because they reduce market 
opportunities and potentially result in loss 
of jobs they tend to worsen the situation 
for workers. As a rule they affect develop-
ing countries, as the weaker partners in 
trade agreements. Whether such an effect 
is regarded as “successful” depends on the 
objective pursued. Where labour clauses 
are intended to create a level playing field 
and protect one side’s workers from unfair 
competition, trade sanctions certainly have 
the potential to produce results. But they 
are not suited to improving the situation 
of labour in the partner country. That is 
more likely to be achieved through finan-
cial sanctions, especially where the fines 
are used for projects benefiting workers – 
as proposed in the Canada-Colombia Agree-
ment. In future trade agreements the EU 
should therefore seek to include financial 
sanctions for violations of labour standards 
in the dispute settlement mechanism, but 
not trade sanctions. 
Dialogue mechanisms: Norms and institu-
tions must change if society is to progress. 
Colombia for example lacks experience in 
negotiating compromises between groups 
in society. The fact that trade unions do not 
(and cannot) influence government actually 
makes it easier for them to adopt extreme 
positions, such as complete rejection of 
FTAs. But real influence on the political 
process is only possible where functioning 
institutions exist for stakeholder dialogue, 
as well as practical experience with such 
dialogue and a willingness to compromise. 
The EU agreement and the European Parlia-
ment’s resolution could make a modest 
contribution to promoting societal dialogue 
in Colombia. 
In its FTAs the EU must also demand that 
civil society in the partner countries be in-
volved in an organised form in formulating 
and implementing trade agreements. One 
important instrument here would be com-
plaints mechanisms for civil society groups. 
These could be modelled on an OECD in-
strument: the National Contact Points for 
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises. This would have the advantage 
of using a plurilateral instrument, rather 
than unilaterally imposing the ideas and 
wishes of the stronger partner. It would also 
mean that one OECD instrument had already 
been introduced, should the partner country 
be interested in joining the organisation. 
Coherence of demands: The requirements 
placed on the partner country must be 
coherent. This means avoiding a situation 
where different bilateral trade agreements 
place different requirements on a country’s 
internal politics. Especially in the case of 
large trading nations, there is a danger that 
they will seek to use such agreements to en-
force their own labour and environmental 
standards in the weaker partner country. 
Such a constellation can be avoided if the 
requirements are based on internationally 
agreed standards. In the area of labour 
standards the EU should therefore continue 
to rely on agreements concluded under the 
auspices of the ILO. 
Experience from development coopera-
tion: Trade partners should coordinate 
with one another and ideally pursue a 
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multilateral approach over issues where 
they demand that their counterparts 
change their internal policies. Great chal-
lenges arise where a country concludes 
bilateral trade agreements with several 
different parties, each generating different 
requirements concerning political reforms 
and associated verification mechanisms. In 
the case of Colombia it was positive that 
the trade partners orientated their demands 
largely on the US Action Plan. But even 
then, the effort required to implement the 
agreements is multiplied. Parallel reporting 
requirements and discussion processes arise 
and different verification missions have to 
be hosted, sometimes simultaneously. This 
may prove too much for the often weak ad-
ministrations in developing countries. It is 
therefore important that future trade policy 
avoid repeating the mistakes that develop-
ment cooperation is only just learning to 
overcome. 
In 2005 the donor countries adopted the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In 
essence it provides for recipient countries 
to define their own development strategies 
(ownership). The role of the donors is to 
support these strategies and coordinate 
and simplify their own processes. The case 
of Colombia illustrates what this would 
ideally require: harmonisation of required 
labour protection reforms on the basis of 
international agreements, joint verification 
of progress achieved, and exchange of in-
formation and assessments. The simplest 
way to realise such a process would for the 
trade partners to draw on the expertise of 
international organisations and grant them 
a central role in implementation; in the 
context of labour that would mean the ILO. 
Control of implementation: Political pres-
sure to actually implement labour clauses 
is generated above all through concrete 
demands and agreements, along with verifi-
cation of their realisation. The correspond-
ing controls place considerable adminis-
trative and financial burdens on bilateral 
partners and may encounter limits, as de-
monstrated by the aforementioned example 
of implementation of trade union rights in 
Colombia. A coordinated joint approach by 
the various trade partners is therefore more 
efficient. 
Cooperation among European institu-
tions: European Parliament’s 2012 reso-
lution relied on the additional powers 
granted under the Treaty of Lisbon. But 
from the outset the EU Commission took 
the position that the sustainability title it 
had negotiated adequately addressed the 
issues, including labour standards. After-
wards too, the Commission and the Euro-
pean External Action Service (EEAS) con-
tinued to show little interest in discussing 
the content of the resolution and the 
Colombian road map, even though the 
resolution calls on the Commission to 
support Colombia with implementation 
and report regularly on progress. The reluc-
tance of Commission and EEAS to engage 
with the resolution is regrettable. It means 
that, in the case of Colombia, Europe is 
holding back from exerting as much influ-
ence as it potentially could on this impor-
tant issue. Looking ahead, it would be 
desirable for the EU institutions to act more 
cooperatively (and naturally to respect the 
division of powers between executive and 
legislative). 
Support for partner countries: Europe 
must give financial and technical support 
for sustainable change in partner countries. 
Limited administrative capacities, inad-
equate enforcement of legislation and weak 
institutional infrastructure are all typical 
development problems that hamper effi-
cient governance. Often external support 
is required in order to realise far-reaching 
reforms and consistent implementation of 
legislative initiatives, including in the area 
of labour. This is traditionally a matter for 
development cooperation. As contemporary 
trade policy encroaches into partners’ in-
ternal affairs, it should draw on the instru-
ments and experiences of development 
policy to support reform processes and 
strengthen state and/or private capacities. 
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Sustainability in production and con-
sumption: Labour clauses in FTAs are only 
a second-best solution, because modern 
trade is simply not sustainable. That is not 
a defect of trade policy or the agreements 
in question, but the logical consequence of 
patterns of production and consumption 
based on prices that fail to reflect the true 
costs to society. The international Sustain-
able Development Goals identify where 
change is needed. The long-term goal of sus-
tainable production and consumption must 
not be lost sight of. 
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